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Abstract: One of the significant problems for philosophy’s development into a more diverse 
discipline is the familiar sharp reduction in the proportion of women and students of color 
after initial, introductory-level courses. This contributes to a lack in the breadth of perspective 
and experience that both upper-level students and faculty bring to philosophy, which in 
turn undermines the strength of the discipline as a whole. Much of the transformation of 
philosophy must necessarily happen at the departmental, and even university, level; but 
there are, nonetheless, a number of strategies available to individual teachers of philosophy to 
help to retain marginalized students—from the composition of course syllabi and assignment 
choices, to increased awareness of challenges within the discipline to students’ success and 
embracing error as a learning tool. This variety of pedagogical tools provides a means to help 
to make philosophy more broadly inclusive.
There is, as is well known, a precipitous drop-off in students of color and women after introductory-level philosophy classes, and the numbers continue to worsen 
the further along one goes. However, there are a number of strategies available to 
teachers of philosophy to help to address this phenomenon in their classrooms—
from the composition of the course syllabus and assignment choices, to increased 
awareness of the challenges in the discipline to many students’ success, to embracing 
error as a learning tool. As we will also see, increasing the diversity of students, 
and ultimately faculty is of benefit not only to students themselves but essential to 
the strength of our discipline.
As Molly Paxton, Carrie Figdor, and Valerie Tiberius’s research shows with 
respect to gender, women are already somewhat under-represented in introductory 
philosophy classes in the United States, constituting fewer than 40 percent of these 
©2015 American Association of Philosophy Teachers pp. 3–16
ISSN 2380-4076
AAPT Studies in Pedagogy 1 (2015): Practices in Pedagogy
DOI: 10.5840/aaptstudies20159161 Online First: 
4Practices in Pedagogy
students, and the situation only worsens at every subsequent point in academia.1 A 
still smaller proportion of philosophy majors are women; that proportion shrinks 
again for female philosophy graduate students, and yet again when it comes to the 
proportion of female faculty in the discipline. When it comes to racial disparity, 
philosophy is in a state even more dire than as regards to gender. Once we consider 
that slightly more than 50 percent of the US is female2 but under 17 percent of full-
time philosophy faculty are,3 and that people of color made up close on 40 percent of 
the population but a vanishingly small percentage of our faculty, it becomes evident 
just how severely distorted philosophy’s demographics are. Indeed, a majority of 
college students, in virtue of their race, gender, or both, belong to one or more 
groups that are grossly underrepresented in the subject.
This is a problem not only of social injustice—that is, not merely an injustice 
against the students dissuaded from pursuing philosophy further—but, crucially, 
for the discipline itself, which is deeply impoverished by the loss of a majority of 
its potential members, and all of the insight, talent, and variety of perspective lost 
with them.
Our discipline is, very clearly, in need of substantive change of the kind that 
has transformed the rest of the humanities over the course of the last half century 
or so, and much of which must be necessarily systemic in nature and far broader 
than is within the scope of this chapter. However, there are nonetheless significant 
and effective strategies available to individual teachers to promote change in their 
own classrooms, and which offer at least modest means to address the extraordinary 
disconnect between academic philosophy and society at large, even without 
support at the departmental level. In this chapter I share a number of strategies I’ve 
employed in my own teaching to try to address these sorts of concerns and retain 
more underrepresented students in philosophy.
Updating Syllabi
There are organizations that have begun to address the lack of equity within the 
discipline,4 but we, as individual teachers of philosophy, also address it within our 
own classrooms. There are many complex and interacting factors underlying the 
inequity of philosophy, and it’s still far from clear precisely what these are—though 
there is evidence that changes at the faculty level can improve undergraduate 
diversity; Paxton et al. show that the proportion of female undergraduate philosophy 
majors is positively correlated with the proportion of female faculty.5 Of more 
immediate interest, Toni Adleberg, Morgan Thompson, and Eddy Nahmias’s recent 
large-scale survey at Georgia State University demonstrated the positive effects 
of exposing students to a more representative selection of philosophers through 
introductory syllabi.6
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The composition of the syllabus is one of the clearest ways in which we 
signal to students whose voices matter in philosophy—what kind of people will be 
taken seriously in the discipline. Syllabi composed of readings almost entirely by 
white men give a very definite implicit indication to students of the characteristics 
required to do philosophy, and it is a message that they take to heart. Especially 
with a student body as thoroughly racially, ethnically, and linguistically diverse 
as that which I’ve predominantly taught—students with first languages ranging 
from English and Spanish to Korean and Igbo—the incongruence and illogicality 
of presenting them with the thought of only a small sliver of humanity is obvious.
Encouragingly, though, Adleberg et al.’s findings show that fewer women drop 
philosophy after their introductory course when there has been an increase in the 
representation of women on the syllabus. Developing a course with more broadly 
representative readings thus seems a promising strategy for increasing retention of 
female students, and potentially effective also at mitigating current rates of attrition 
among students of color.
I reconsidered my own long-standing syllabus for Introduction to Philosophy 
in an attempt to apply the lessons of this research. Although I’d made various 
changes over the years, I hadn’t specifically addressed the dearth of readings by 
female philosophers and philosophers of color. In adopting a selection of the texts 
that were the primary focus of my own undergraduate classes, I found that I had 
produced an exceptionally narrow syllabus in terms of both gender and race. 
Strikingly, so poor was the diversity of the material I had been assigning, that even 
after its first overhaul just under 20 percent of the readings were written by female 
philosophers, and it included the work of only a single philosopher of color.
It is instructive, I think, to realize that even concerted effort may leave us in a 
position where we are presenting students with a still dramatically unrepresentative 
syllabus—which is a problem not only for students of color and women, but also 
for white, male students. The latter are deprived of that breadth of insight that can 
be gained only from being exposed to diversity in the philosophers they study; from 
the breadth of perspective provided when a wide variety of students feel comfortable 
engaging in class; and ultimately, should they become professional philosophers, 
from the greater philosophical rigor achieved in developing and defending one’s 
arguments in a less homogenous group of peers, who are thus more likely to identify 
what are otherwise all but invisible shared assumptions.
My own syllabus, though improved, is very much a work in progress. Yet, 
even with these relatively modest changes, I have noticed a striking difference in 
patterns of student engagement corresponding to the newly introduced material. 
My most recent Introduction to Philosophy class still began with a large number of 
all-white philosophers and I found that, despite my best attempts to coax them into 
class participation, a number of students continued to demur. However, when we 
got to the section on personal and social identity, and a selection from W.E.B. Du 
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Bois’s The Souls of Black Folk7—suddenly a significant minority of those who had 
hardly spoken up to this point, disproportionately students of color, were actively 
arguing and debating the material. One women, in particular, who had said not 
a word to the class as a whole before, was now assuredly arguing many detailed 
points in lectures. It was clear from her and others’ contributions, that this was the 
first material of the course that engaged them sufficiently that they felt moved to 
respond because of the ideas themselves and not simply because it was required.
How then to create a pedagogically sound, diverse syllabus? As college teachers 
we typically face great time limitations, and the temptation to continue teaching 
what we have already prepared and know well can be irresistible. Fortunately, there 
are many useful online resources to help with diversifying syllabi.8 The American 
Philosophical Association (APA) maintains an excellent and extensive listing of 
Resources on Diversity and Inclusiveness, a Diversity in Philosophy page (under the 
auspices of its Committee on the Status of Women), including the Underrepresented 
Philosophers Database, a Diversity and Inclusiveness Syllabus Collection, and the 
Diversity Syllabi Project. Other helpful online resources are a shared document, to 
which many philosophers have contributed, “Core readings in philosophy by female 
authors for undergraduate curricula”; a list of some Works by Female Philosophers 
that may be used in introduction to philosophy classes, hosted by Tim O’Keefe 
at Georgia State University; the “Women philosophers books for courses” on the 
Women Philosophers site, created by Kate Lindemann, Emerita at Mount Saint 
Mary College; and the Re-Reading the Canon series.
There are times, though, when one has specific syllabus requirements or 
difficulties that a general resource typically can’t help with. This is where the 
judicious use of social media can be invaluable. Platforms such as Facebook offer 
an excellent way to solicit input and have questions answered by friends and 
colleagues particularly, while a broader medium such as Twitter can be very helpful 
for garnering feedback from a wider community of teachers. In seeking syllabus 
suggestions via social media, the usual commonsense guidelines apply—keep 
the request brief but specific, and appeal to your readers’ skills and experience as 
teachers, rather than focusing exclusively on the request. Many of what have turned 
out to be my most effective readings are the result of soliciting help via social media.
Developing an Accessible Syllabus
The general lack of gender and racial diversity of introductory syllabi has the further 
very significant effect of increasing the overall difficulty of reading comprehension 
for many students. Dealing with texts that are written within and make reference 
to a cultural tradition one is unfamiliar with can be a marked barrier to student 
success. For those within the relevant culture this is an element that may easily 
be invisible—yet, as the work of Ismail Hakki Erten and Salim Razi,9 and many 
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others, makes clear, it has very material affects; simply put, “cultural familiarity 
facilitates comprehension.”10 For students who do not share the same cultural (and 
often also linguistic) background as the philosophers whose works they study—or 
who share less in common with such writers than do their instructors, say—having 
to learn and develop new schema, to make sense of the context within which the 
relevant philosophical arguments are being made, entails significant extra intellectual 
labor. If instructors are unaware of this additional work that students lacking a 
certain cultural proficiency must perform, or if they discount it, this significantly 
disadvantages these students relative to those for whom the cultural context is 
more familiar.
There are two approaches here that may mitigate this problem. The first is to 
re-evaluate the cultural focus of introductory philosophy so that it becomes more 
broadly representative of philosophical thought in general, globally. The second, 
more modest, approach is at least to mark the cultural and personal elements 
that produced the philosophy being studied; to explicitly label and present its 
constituents as the products of particular contexts and times, rather than present 
it as some sort of philosophy simpliciter.
Why this matters for the retention of those typically marginalized students of 
other cultural backgrounds is that it makes clearer a vital part of the work needed 
to understand the material by bringing to students’ attention the crucial contextual 
elements necessary to, in effect, “decode” a text and its arguments. We all draw 
upon these elements in the analysis of philosophy texts. For instance, to be able to 
make sense of David Lewis’s example—concerning, “something that is part of this 
world: Hubert Humphrey, say”; someone who “might have won the presidency 
but didn’t, [and] so [...] satisfies the modal formula ‘possibly x wins’ but not the 
formula ‘x wins’11—I had to draw on my knowledge of when Lewis had written 
this and his nationality, what the most likely referent was of his allusion to “the 
presidency,” and so forth.
Being a foreigner, and not yet born when Humphrey was beaten by Nixon 
for the US presidency in the late 1960s, I had never heard of him. I was able to 
look up who he was and to confirm that it was indeed the US presidency that was 
being referenced, to better make sense of this example, but it was nonetheless a 
distraction, and one that prevented this illustration of Lewis’s point from being 
nearly as clear and, indeed, immediately and obviously illustrative as it would be 
to someone for whom Humphrey’s presidential run was common knowledge. This 
was, of course, merely a minor distraction, but for many students of philosophy 
these are not occasional, isolated incidents, but form the great bulk of the work 
they do in our classes, work necessary before they can even begin to engage more 
substantively with philosophical texts.
By acknowledging the salience of context, this critical approach to the readings 
we assign can help increase student confidence by legitimizing their own views, 
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insofar as these may not as closely accord with those who enjoy more cultural 
commonality with the thinkers in question. Where students may be alienated 
by the limited number of readings by anyone like themselves, making explicit 
those factors that underlie this lack (explaining the cultural history of racism and 
sexism12 that has shaped our discipline and determined which philosophers have 
been remembered and cited, and which of these in turn are deemed most worthy 
of discussion) and that could contribute to feelings of alienation is a powerful way 
at least to acknowledge and legitimize this experience, as opposed to its being 
ignored and students finishing the class with the conviction that philosophy simply 
isn’t for them.
One of the reasons it matters for philosophy that such students are retained 
in far greater numbers, is that they are better placed to be able to identify those 
aspects of Western philosophical argument that are unwittingly reliant on pervasive 
cultural assumptions;13 ones too deeply embedded to be readily evident to those 
without differing cultural perspectives, and too lacking in incongruity to prompt 
change. I’ve focused mainly on cultural background here, but naturally this applies 
equally to many other characteristics, such gender, race, class, gender identity, 
and sexual orientation. And an invaluable tool to help us discern the role of such 
factors in philosophy is to ensure that we, as teachers, explore our own privilege 
and how that informs the examples and language we use in class, as well as the 
particular readings we select. Very often the appearance of universality is simply 
the invisibility of commonality.
Reimagining Assignments
In addition to using a more inclusive syllabus, designing more creative and 
non-traditional assignments in your philosophy class can be a powerful way to 
circumvent already ingrained beliefs students have in their inability to successfully 
produce rigorously analytical writing and critical analyses of difficult texts. It’s easy 
for philosophy instructors—who, after all, were typically the strongest students 
in their own undergraduate philosophy classes—to be unaware of just how 
intimidating exercises aimed at teaching the skills of the discipline can be. Often 
these assignments, in fact, presuppose a good deal of facility with these skills already, 
as well as the confidence to use them effectively.
In my informal observation of my students over a number of years of teaching, 
I’ve noticed a definite correlation between students’ confidence in their abilities—
particularly in areas such as critical analysis of and engagement with texts—and 
whether or not they belong to groups typically marginalized in the discipline, and 
of course in academia and society more broadly. Stereotype threat is known to make 
even those who have significant skill under-perform in many academic situations.14 
The problem is bigger than just lower grades; there are also the lasting effects of 
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the mechanism by which this occurs—through the undermining of students’ faith 
in their own abilities. Good grades, on their own, may not have very much effect 
in bolstering self-confidence; indeed, many students who appear most comfortable 
in their abilities are quite unmoved by consistently lackluster grades.
Often, too, those students least likely to continue with and major in 
philosophy come from significantly disadvantaged educational backgrounds that 
have inadequately prepared them for the specific sort of critical analysis demanded 
by philosophy, even at the introductory level. Of course, one way of approaching 
this is to assign less challenging readings, with the original texts predigested in 
the form of secondary sources, with simpler explanations of complex, historical 
material. This has the disadvantage, though, of keeping those students who already 
have less than ideal educational backgrounds from learning the sorts of difficult 
analytical skills they are most lacking. On the other hand, presenting them with 
texts they’re unable to understand effectively can cause them simply to disengage, 
and can further entrench belief in their own lack of ability or intelligence.
There are a variety of less traditional assignments than the standard reading 
summary or critical analysis of a text, though, that can bypass existing wariness 
and negative self-perception, yet still help students to develop and demonstrate the 
same essential philosophical skills.15 One approach I’ve had significant success with 
in my classes is that of asking students to write a series of short journal entries as 
the given text’s author, answering a couple of questions concerning the material.
This sort of assignment can be framed in a variety of ways; for instance, one 
might ask that they write as the philosopher in question when they were planning out 
the article and address the questions of what points they felt were most significant, 
and what arguments they worried might be misunderstood by the reader and in 
what way. To do this assignment, the student has to read the material carefully, 
discern the most important points, and work out what arguments the philosopher is 
trying to convey—essentially to give a summary of the work—but with the attempt 
to take on the mindset and even the writing style of the given philosopher, serving 
to help the student better identify what the author was getting at in the text. (And 
many students produce great, and often amusing imitations, which makes grading 
far more enjoyable.) The relative informality of the assignment format also serves to 
disarm students’ preconceived notions about their own abilities. It’s far more likely 
they will believe themselves able to write something as seemingly simple as a journal 
entry, as opposed to something presented as a textual analysis or critical summary.
Another strategy I’ve found effective is to give a first reading assignment that 
is as engaging and unintimidating as possible—typically this takes the form of an 
advertisement that I ask students to create, selling the main idea of the reading to 
prospective students.16 I give them free rein as to the style and format, and they have 
produced a range of flyers, posters, and pamphlets in response. What is striking 
about the submissions is not only their creativity, but the degree of understanding of 
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the assigned text that many of them demonstrate. I initially offered this assignment 
primarily as just a fun ice-breaker, but was surprised to find the work it produced 
actually evinced an engagement with the reading that made it an academically 
worthwhile assignment in its own right.
A third example of the sort of assignment I use is to ask students to carefully 
read an article and think through the argument the philosopher is making, taking 
notes for themselves as they go, and then to find a willing friend or family member 
to whom to try to explain the philosopher’s position and persuade of its truth 
(regardless of their own beliefs as to its veracity). I have them submit a brief write-up 
of their discussion, detailing how it went, whether they managed to convince their 
interlocutor, and any problems they may have encountered. The process of trying to 
convey the text’s argument to another person is an excellent way for students to work 
out any gaps in their own understanding. Many students report back their surprise 
that, as soon as they began to try to teach the apparently straightforward reading to 
someone else, they found there were elements of it they hadn’t fully understood. 
A number also ended up working with their interlocutors to collaboratively figure 
out the philosopher’s argument.
With any assignment of this kind, it’s useful to provide a few guiding questions 
to help students to navigate and interrogate the reading, so that they have a starting 
point for their engagement with it. And these assignments serve not only to help 
them to gain critical reading skills through working with the texts in this way, but 
also crucial experience of their own capability to tackle challenging texts. When 
it comes to longer, traditional essay writing, these assignments can also be very 
helpful for purposes of review.
Giving plenty of relatively low-pressure, non-traditional assignments—and 
ideally ones without a great deal of emphasis on grades (I make all of my reading 
assignments credit/no credit, rather than assigning a specific grade to them, 
for instance)—helps to build up crucial philosophical skills, and also helps to 
demonstrate to students the necessity of diligent, systematic work to develop these 
abilities. Making clear to students that this sort of hard work is the route to success 
in philosophy, turns out to be an essential part of retaining marginalized students 
in the discipline.
Philosophy, much like a discipline such as mathematics, is seen as requiring 
an inherent (just have-the-brain-for-it-or-not) kind of intelligence and talent—far 
more so than any other discipline in the humanities, and this sort of presumption 
has been shown to be strongly predictive of less success on the part of women 
and minorities.17 When the assumption is that only certain people naturally 
have philosophical ability, far more of those students typically marginalized in 
philosophy are apt to reason from other social messages (that they are less capable 
and intelligent) to the conclusion that they are surely not one of these naturally 
gifted people. This undermines motivation, since—if the key factor is innate 
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ability—there is no point in trying to build one’s skills when one doesn’t have that 
inherent intelligence to begin with.
Stereotype threat is another significant, related problem for student retention 
and success.18 This phenomenon is so pernicious that even the mere awareness of 
stereotypes that women or people of color aren’t as smart or don’t do as well at 
this type of work —whether or not this stereotype is even endorsed—is sufficient 
to markedly reduce the performance of students who identify as belonging to the 
stereotyped group.19
There are, fortunately, resources available to teachers to combat these sorts 
of challenges.20 And, there is evidence that even very simple interventions, such as 
merely having students complete an exercise focusing them on their core values, 
can have striking benefits.21 Of particular relevance here is the value of multiple, 
less traditional assignments, which both offer a format novel enough to be relatively 
free of strongly stereotyped associations with the sort of person who is good at 
them, and which also help to demonstrate to students how this sort of diligent 
work, in small units over a sustained period, can develop the skills they need to 
do philosophy. Numerous other scholars have detailed the closely related benefits 
of scaffolding assignments—breaking large assignments into smaller steps—and 
while this is not something I will discuss here, it is certainly a further useful means 
to address these issues.22
Assignments that build in the incremental development of philosophical skills, 
therefore play a central role in conveying to students the necessity of sustained, 
careful work rather than some sort of inherent smartness. And this message can do 
a great deal to support the work of women and students of color.
Embracing Error
A significant barrier to doing well in philosophy, which I’ve found in looking at 
both my students’ writing and my own, is the notion that one should be producing 
perfectly finished and flawless work right from the beginning. This is a very ingrained 
and widely held belief, and one that’s especially daunting and discouraging for those 
students already facing the undermining effects of stereotype threat and related 
challenges when doing philosophy.
While it’s of great importance to foster students’ confidence in their skills 
alongside the development of the skills themselves, another key to the success of 
students typically marginalized in the philosophy classroom is to embrace, and even 
celebrate, error. This may run counter to the intuitive impulse of the dedicated 
teacher—who aims to help students do well in their courses—and certainly doesn’t 
come naturally to students. But error is inevitable, and embracing and using it 
when it arises may turn it into a great learning tool. Allowing for and encouraging 
error has had very positive effects in my classroom, in helping more students to 
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ask questions and suggest answers, and in making it easier for them to tackle the 
difficult and often very unfamiliar type of work required in our discipline. This 
shift has been reflected in my student evaluations, a number of which now remark 
on the “comfortable,” “safe and positive,” and “welcoming” learning environment.
Many students who tend to have difficulty with philosophy are multilingual 
learners, for whom English may not be their first language. A focus on accuracy 
and correctness throughout the learning process, rather than primarily in the final 
product (such as the final version of an essay), can be a considerable hindrance 
to such students’ achievement. Part of the explanation for this lies in cognitive 
load theory, which explains that when students are working on acquiring new 
skills—such the critical analysis and advanced reading comprehension needed in 
philosophy—their performance of already acquired skills will worsen.23 In other 
words, students’ existing level of proficiency in the language of instruction may 
well not be accurately reflected in their assignments.
We all have limited cognitive resources, particularly in terms of working 
memory. When we concentrate on work requiring the development of new skills 
and involving difficult and unfamiliar material, we have less attention and cognitive 
processing power available for other tasks, and so language and other errors are very 
likely to creep in. Of course, this applies also to aspects of native speakers’ language 
skills—and, indeed, to any ability that requires intensive cognitive processing. 
Fortunately, there are multiple strategies available to us as teachers to support our 
students in acquiring the skills they need to do philosophy.
One essential component of this is to provide plenty of opportunities for 
revision. This lets students concentrate initially on analyzing and responding to a 
philosopher’s arguments, say; then to address any gaps in or problems with their 
own arguments in a revised version; and, finally, to pay closer attention to correcting 
errors in their use of language. If students are required to produce flawlessly written, 
grammatically perfect papers from the start, the result is more fluent writing but 
less rigorous philosophy.
For students’ revised work to build on the existing strengths of their work 
and improve on less developed aspects, constructive and supportive grading is 
key. There are exceedingly few of us who can received a manuscript riddled with 
red pen marks and see it as an exciting opportunity for improvement. The most 
common response is feelings of unhappiness and shame at how much one has 
“gotten wrong,” and the typical impulse is to hide the offending document and try 
to think of it as little as possible. Avoiding revising the assignment can then become 
a means of coping, but one that is likely to be interpreted as laziness or a genuine 
lack of necessary ability.
Being a former copy editor, I spent many years as a teacher with red pen 
in hand, correcting almost every error I saw and giving grades that reflected all 
these myriad student mistakes—in everything from grammar to logical structure. 
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Remarkably, though, since I’ve shifted to grading almost everything in my courses 
as simply credit/no credit, and to highlighting what students have gotten right, 
as well as offering them suggestions of what practical things they could do to 
improve their work—they have been submitting far better, more engaged writing. 
The amount of effort they put into their assignments has, if anything, increased, 
despite the significantly decreased emphasis on grades. Credit/no credit grading 
means that they are penalized for not completing the work of the course, but that 
they have the freedom to try out things they’re not yet good at, or to explore a novel 
approach and perhaps fail spectacularly—without any need to worry that they’ll 
damage their overall grade. Nothing kills off real student learning more effectively 
than trying to make as few mistakes as possible.
Another means of using error to enhance student work, is to put a good deal of 
emphasis on the need for messy, rough first drafts that contain numerous mistakes 
and require much revision. In the same way philosophy is seen to be something 
that one either inherently has a gift for or just can’t do, so too many students 
(and I suspect graduate students and faculty as well) believe that good writers are 
able to sit down and produce a near-perfect first draft, straight off. Many of the 
students typically marginalized in philosophy lack confidence in their work because 
they perceive good work as something produced by those with innate talent—as 
something that those with philosophical ability can produce largely without effort, 
and certainly without multiple revisions.
Part of undermining the myth of innate ability and explaining the need for 
effort and consistent hard work to be successful in philosophy, is stressing the 
need for messiness and error in developing good philosophical work. Not only 
is error, and often confusion, a part of this process that cannot be avoided; it’s a 
desirable part, and one to be welcomed. Making errors, getting confused, putting 
together a rough, messy first draft—these are the building blocks of good writing, 
and good philosophy. Indeed, finding out that we must mess up along the way to 
get anywhere really worthwhile, can be the key to doing philosophy.
Transforming our upper-level philosophy classes into ones that genuinely 
reflect the demographics of the society in which they are located will not be a quick 
or simple process. The present inequity in our discipline is deep-rooted and will not 
be easily changed. But we, as teachers of philosophy, are in the fortunate position 
of nonetheless being able to do a great deal to diversify our discipline, and thereby 
immeasurably enrich it for us all.
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and theory as those in a unitary Judeo-Christian god; in a fundamentally individualistic 
conception of the social and the psychological; in a decisive split between reason and 
emotion, mind and body, the rational and the intuited.
14. Saul, “Implicit Bias.”
15. My use of creative assignments of the sort I discuss are in large part inspired and 
informed by John Bean’s classic pedagogical work, Engaging Ideas: The Professor’s Guide 
to Integrating Writing, Critical Thinking, and Active Learning in the Classroom.
16. I owe this assignment idea to Julie Miele Rodas.
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17. Leslie, “How Language Shapes our Perception of the Social World”; Leslie, Cimpian, 
Meyer, and Freeland, “Expectations of Brilliance Underlie Gender Distributions Across 
Academic Disciplines.”
18. Aronson, Quinn, and Spencer, “Stereotype Threat and the Academic Underperformance 
of Minorities and Women”; Saul, “Implicit Bias.”
19. Gendler, “On the Epistemic Costs of Implicit Bias.”
20. A variety of resources to tackle stereotype threat are available at http://
reducingstereotypethreat.org. Last accessed November 21, 2014.
21. Cohen, Garcia, Apfel, and Master, “Reducing the Racial Achievement Gap.”
22. Bean, Engaging Ideas.
23. Kalyuga, Ayres, Chandler, and Sweller, “The Expertise Reversal Effect.”
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